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Abstract
In the economic literature, a common view is that corruption is more an institutional
problem  than  a  market  failure:  malfunctioning  bureaucracy  makes  firms  turn  to
corruption. Following this viewpoint, major International Financial Institutions urge
developing countries to improve their governance in order to secure efficiency in all
international transactions. Still, some observers claim that rent-seekers deliberately
provoke institutional malfunctioning in order to extract private gains. This is to say
that corruption is a built-in element of poor governance. This paper tackles this
endogeneity issue by testing for Granger causality between bad governance and
corruption. The test utilizes dynamic panel data of 117 countries, consisting of World
Bank’s WGI indicators from 1996 to 2013. The paper finds substantial proof for causal
effects between poor governance and corruption, the causal direction depending on
specific measures of the quality of governance. In particular, the findings show that
global anti-corruption efforts have made these causalities clearer, and that they depend
on country-specific socio-economic mentalities.
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JEL classification: D73
		 2
1 Introduction
A common understanding is that corruption undermines democratization, distorts the market, and
biases investment policies (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
Rapidly evolving globalization pushes all countries to follow common norms and practices so that
all international transactions are safe and efficient. Developing countries are typically major playing
fields of both corruption and deficient governance, and global awareness has risen to make things
right in those countries. This stands high in the agenda of International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
such as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose special concern is to
secure efficient use of their funds and loans. Nationally, the global trend means enforcement of
the neoclassical market-based design, where the state is in charge of guaranteeing property rights,
reducing transaction costs, and avoiding expropriations (Khan, 2002a, 2002b).
Corruption can be regarded simply as an act of bribe, as rent-seeking, or even as natural human
behavior. Nye (1967) defines corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”. Khan
(1996) agrees by seeing corruption as “behavior that  deviates from the formal rules of conduct
governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding
motives such as wealth, power, or status”. The World Bank condenses the definition to “the abuse
of public agent for private ends”. By Rose-Ackerman (1999), bribe is “an illegal payment in favor
of a public agent to obtain an advantage that may, or may not be deserved without reward”. Thus,
the exchange contract between the briber and the grafter does not have to guarantee the advantage,
which may be the case e.g. in the context of privatization (Shleifer et al., 1993; Thompson, 1993).
In developed economies, corruption takes more modern forms like lobbying, funding of interest
groups and thought leaders, subsidizing electoral candidates, etc. While economic development
reduces classical types of corruption, it may raise it in its modern forms (Khan, 2002a,b; 2004). In
any case, corruption seems to be more an institutional matter than a plain market distortion.
Governance is a multidimensional concept, which can be perceived at least from three angles: The
selection process of the policymakers (political dimension); Policymakers’ ability to formulate and
implement policy for efficient allocation of resources (economic dimension); and Credibility and
respectability of the institutions (institutional respect dimension). Naturally, economists take
mainly the second angle, which suffices to cover the interplay of corruption and governance. The
above definitions of corruption and the three perceptions of governance highlight the overlap of
corruption and bad governance. Kaufmann (2005) defines governance simply as the institutions
and practices by which authority is used for the national interest, and argues that anticorruption
accords with good governance.
A prevalent line of economic research assumes that corruption is caused by distorted bureaucracy.
For example, administrative slack in allotting licenses, permits, or signatories makes governance
sluggish and inefficient, and corruption is applicable in bypassing these rigidities. Taking this
approach, Bardhan (1997) states that corruption in fact mitigates the pre-existing distortions caused
by malfunctioning governance. Likewise, Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006) finds out that corruption
fosters economic growth, if the quality of governance is low, and Méon & Weill (2008) shows that
corruption tends to boost aggregate efficiency, if governance is deficient. On the other hand,
Myrdal (1968), and Kurer (1993) argue that it is in the bureaucrats’ self-interest to create distortive
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tediousness in order to raise motives for bribery, implying that corruption would influence and
explain the quality of governance. Kaufmann et al. (2000) strongly opposes the idea, and argues
that corruption is endogenous to poor governance thus exacerbating rather than mitigating the
pre-existing distortions. For a proof, a survey over 3000 multinational firms is performed with the
result that bribery in fact increases bureaucratic sluggishness.
In short, there seems to be some distinction in viewpoints: some explain the effects of corruption
by the exogenous state of governance, and others take the interplay between corruption and the
quality of governance endogenous. By no means, neither viewpoint rejects the other, but the
distinction raises up the question of causality between governance and corruption. Many earlier
studies have considered this correlation (e.g. Leff, 1964; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; La Porta, 1999;
Kaufmann, 2000, 2005; Khan, 2004; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Méndez &	Sepúlveda, 2006), but very
few have tested their causal relations. Therefore, this paper empirically tests the causality between
the quality of governance and corruption, and specifies the direction of such causality. Section 2 of
the paper presents the Granger method of causality testing, and the data used in the analysis.
Section 3 presents the empirical findings, and Section 4 concludes.
	
2 Method and data
The relationship between the quality of governance and corruption seems to be a typical “chicken-
egg” paradox. In addressing such cases, the Granger method is commonly used in economics
(Granger, 1969). By definition, there is Granger causality from X to Y, when the utilization of the
histories of both X and Y predicts Y better than the history of Y alone. Such causal relationships
in both ways can be formalized by the following baseline models:	
,	
There is Granger causality from X to Y, if model (1) fits statistically better than.
Likewise, there is Granger causality from Y to X, if model (2) fits better than
.	
In the above equations, λ, γ, and λ’, γ’ denote the coefficients to be estimated, u and u’ denote the
error terms, the subscript i =1,….,N denotes particular cross-sections, t =1,….,T denotes time,
and J	and K denote the number of lag periods. To carry out the test, the coefficients λ, γ, and λ’, γ’
in the baseline models (1) and (2), respectively, have to be estimated. Main attention must be paid
on γ and γ’, as their estimates point to possible existence of causality. The choice of lag periods is
critical, because too few lags provoke autocorrelated errors and thus spurious test statistics, while
too many lags reduce the power of the test. Here, the choice of lag periods obeys the rule of
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012), which says that the minimum time extent for J and K  should be
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chosen according to T>5+2z (where T	is the number of time periods and z is the number of lags).
The error terms u and u’ are assumed to follow a one-way error component model. Since the study
is based on balanced panel data (i.e. no unobserved specific effects), the error term in model (1),
for example, is reduced to the following equation: ui,t =  µi+vi,t,; where µi ~IID(0,σµ2) stands  for
period-specific effects and vi,t ~ IID(0,σv2) represents the error term. The same attributes apply for
model (2), too.
Dynamic panel data regressions are basically subject of estimation bias over time. Since the lagged
dependent variable Yi,t-j 	in equation (1), or Xi,t-j in equation (2), could be also endogenous, their
presence among explanatory variables in the respective models may cause correlation with the error
term. Furthermore, there may also appear effects caused by heterogeneity among the study units.
With dynamic and endogenous regressors, the use of the Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
estimators, or the Fixed Effects (FE) estimators would lead to inconsistent estimates (Baltagi,
1995). Therefore, Blundell & Bond (1998) propose using the two-step System Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator, which is an augmented version of the Difference GMM estimator
of  Arellano  &  Bond  (1991).  The  method  is  commonly  used,  because  it  takes  into  account  all
orthogonality conditions, and allows rigorous control over the instrument matrix.
Referring to the baseline models (1) and (2), let variable X refer to the quality of governance, and
variable Y to the extent of corruption. Data on these variables come from the Worldwide Governance
Indicator 2014 (WGI) dataset published by The World Bank. The dataset includes balanced panel
data of 117 countries listed in Appendix 1. The time span is from 1996 to 2013, with 15 periodical
observations on six aspects of the quality of governance. The aggregated indicators for the quality
of governance are1:
- Voice and accountability (denoted VA), which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media”
- Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS), which “reflects perceptions of the
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”;
- Government effectiveness (GE), which “reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the
quality if policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies”;
- Regulatory quality (RQ), which “reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development”;
- Rule of law (RL), which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”;
- Control of corruption (COR).
The COR indicator is used for the corruption variable, since it attempts to capture the extent to
which bureaucrats resort to opportunistic behavior for private ends. Originally, all governance
																																																								1	For further details on the indicators, see Kaufmann et al. (2010).	
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indicators score from -2.5 to 2.5, with the upper bound indicating best possible quality of
governance, and full integrity for COR as a corruption variable. For ease of interpretation, the
indicators are transformed by subtracting their original values from 3.5. As a result, the transformed
indicator  values  vary  from  1  to  6,  with  the  upper  bound  standing  for  the  worst  quality  of
governance, and for utmost corruption with COR. Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics of
the set of variables.
3 Empirical results
The first thing is to ensure that the time series are stationary, meaning that their distribution neither
follows any trend nor changes over time, which is a key requirement for the validity of time series
regressions. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller method is used with the null hypothesis that all panels
contain a unit root, saying that the series are nonstationary. The alternative hypothesis of stationarity
is accepted, if the probability is less than the critical value 0.05. As can be seen from Appendix 2,
the conclusion is that all series are stationary. This is confirmed also by the Philipps-Perron unit-
root test, the results of which are also reported in Appendix 2.
To test the existence of Granger-causality between the quality of governance and the extent of
corruption, the Two-step System GMM is used. GMM yields asymptotically robust estimators, and
all variables enter regression with their logarithmic values. For the lag length, 2 is chosen, which
seems optimal since it enables to eliminate serial correlation in residuals (Arellano, 2003). The
Arellano tests AR (1) and AR (2) are used to respect the condition of Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012).
In equation (1), the test of whether poor governance causes corruption is based on the Wald test
with the null hypothesis that the values of the lagged variables of poor governance are zero, which
means that these regressors have no predictive contains for Yi,t (i.e. γ1=γ2=…γK=0).  The  same
applies for equation (2) in the opposite direction (i.e. γ1’=γ2’=…γK’=0). Following the benchmark
models, due attention is paid on the coefficient of the sum of the lagged variables of governance
in equation (1), and alternatively on the sum of the lagged variables of corruption in equation (2).
If the coefficient is significant, the explanatory variable explains the dependent variable (positively
or negatively). When studying causality, positive or negative coefficients of the explanatory variable
have the same interpretation.2
3.1 Granger causality test – preliminary specification
For preliminary investigation of Granger causality between the quality of governance and
corruption, the models (1) and (2) are tested as such along the procedure presented in the previous
section.  This  is  to  say  that  possible  causality  is  examined  in  both  ways,  from  the  quality  of
governance to corruption, that is model (1), and from corruption to the quality of governance, that
is model (2). The tests are made according to each indicator of the quality of governance. The full
results of the Granger causality tests are reported in Table 1.
																																																								2	Note that the signs of the estimated coefficients tell about effects rather than causes. Yet, the interpretation in this
case is similar. 	
	
		
Table 1: Results of Granger causality tests between Corruption and the quality of Governance
	
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA®COR COR ®VA PS ® COR COR ® PS GE®COR COR ®GE RQ ®COR COR ®RQ RL ®COR COR ®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.760***
(0.03)
-0.012
(0.020)
0.741***
(0.035)
0.086**
(0.033)
0.738***
(0.041)
0.003
(0.028)
0.761***
(0.038)
0.000
(0.029)
0.682***
(0.045)
0.024
(0.032)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.128*
(0.051)
0.041.
(0.024)
0.119*
(0.055)
-0.013
(0.030)
0.111*
(0.051)
0.043
(0.032)
0.130*
(0.054)
0.057*
(0.028)
0.119*
(0.047)
0.040.
(0.022)
0.082*
(0.039)
-0.011
(0.018)
0.085.
(0.043)
-0.029
(0.029)
0.057
(0.046)
0.009
(0.027)
0.059
(0.046)
0.006
(0.02)
0.066
(0.049)
0.038
(0.029)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.118*
(0.051)
0.960***
(0.034)
0.110***
(0.029)
0.786***
(0.044)
0.070
(0.051)
0.783***
(0.050)
0.046
(0.045)
0.861***
(0.05)
0.255***
(0.074)
0.924***
(0.062)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.033
(0.057)
-0.099*
(0.041)
-0.025
(0.031)
0.074.
(0.041)
0.013
(0.052)
0.116.
(0.059)
-0.038
(0.047)
0.014
(0.034)
-0.044
(0.086)
-0.008
(0.068)
-0.056
(0.041)
0.106***
(0.029)
-0.010
(0.021)
0.043
(0.028)
0.009
(0.038)
0.021
(0.042)
0.041
(0.039)
0.040
(0.029)
-0.059
(0.045)
-0.044.
(0.026)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan testa (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1)b (p-value) 1.2175e-09 3.9678e-08 3.3884e-09 5.1984e-15 6.8559e-09 5.1149e-08 3.3749e-09 2.22e-16 4.6125e-09 5.5864e-10
AR (2)b (p-value) 0.88478 0.92163 0.97637 0.34706 0.71062 0.2212 0.78187 0.0377 0.7557 0.38242
Wald test for coefficientsc (46066.7)*** (62415.27)*** (28465.5)*** (4537.64)*** (20784.1)*** (34527)*** (19465.3)*** (14072.7)*** (19438.7)*** (33227.6)***
Wald test for time dummiesc (33.578)*** (23.145)*** (26.393)*** (15.818) (30.43)*** (45.544)*** (30.489)*** (25.248)*** (29.052)*** (19.308)
Notes: a The null hypothesis of the Sargan test (robust to autocorrelation) is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. b The null hypothesis of the AR (1) and AR (2) tests is that the residual
from the estimations is first-order, but not second-order correlated. c The Wald test checks whether GOVERNANCEt-i =0 for equation (1) and CORRUPTIONt-i =0 for equation (2). c The null hypothesis
of the Wald test for time dummies examines whether dummyt=0 (the GMM technique always generates tests for times). Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. The following
superscripts ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’, ‘.’ represent the statistical significance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
	
		
Table 1 shows that the dependent variables in models (1) and (2) are significantly predicted by their
respective past values. In the estimations of model (1) (possible causality from bad quality of
governance to corruption), the coefficients of the two lagged variables of corruption are always
statistically different from zero. However, the coefficient estimate of the sum of lagged variables
of governance (row 6 in bold, left colums) is never significant, meaning that there is no Granger
causality from any of the five governance indicators to corruption. With the reverse model (2)
(possible causality from corruption to the deterioration of the quality of governance), the
endogenous variables are also (at least to some extent) statistically predicted by their past values,
but the estimates of the sum of the lagged variables of corruption (row 3 in bold, right columns)
are again never significant. Hence, there seems to be no Granger causality from corruption to
deficient governance.
To synthesize the results of Table 1, it seems that poor governance does not cause corruption, and
corruption does not cause poor governance. This is quite surprising, at least in the light of the
intuitively appealing proposition by Kaufmann (2000) that corruption should endogenously lead
to poor governance, and exacerbate economic distortions. Even a quick look on the country-wise
data shows that excessive corruption and bad quality of governance usually go hand-in-hand, and
vice versa. The finding somewhat contradicts also the mainstream neoclassical view of efficient
governance in securing property rights with a low risk of expropriation, and preserving collective
interests – why shouldn’t idle control of corruption make it less efficient (see Khan, 2000a,b)?
3.2 Closer scrutiny on Granger causality
By all means, the above result that there is no Granger causality between poor governance and
corruption  needs  closer  assessment  with  further  specifications  on  models  (1)  and  (2).  Two
specifications are tried, one concerning possible changes in the governance-corruption nexus over
time, and the other concerning possible differences in the nexus between country types.
Concerning the first specification, it is quite plausible that the governance-corruption causality is
time-dependent, and that there may exist some critical breaking points that affect it. One quite
obvious breaking point is due to the rapidly rising awareness of the necessity of the struggle against
corruption in the beginning of the 21st century. As a prominent example of this awareness, 140
countries have ratified the anti-corruption agreements of the UN convention in 2003 in Mérida,
Mexico. The widely adopted anti-corruption measures should have had worldwide influence on
the extent of corruption. A plausible assumption is that the links to the quality of governance, if
any, should have also been shaken (ref. e.g. Charron, 2001 on the impact of foreign aid on
corruption).
To test the breaking point proposition, a time dummy variable is constructed so that it is 1 for
years after 2000 and 0 otherwise. The interaction term between the time-dummy (denoted
Post2000)  and  the  key  variables  are  then  included  among the  predictors.  Models  (1)  and  (2)  are
estimated following the same procedure as in the previous case. The results of these estimations
are reported in Table 2.
		
Table 2: Regression results: Granger causality tests between Corruption and Poor governance in the post 2000s
	
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA COR COR VA PS COR COR PS GE COR COR GE RQ COR COR RQ RL COR COR RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.885***
(0.049)
-0.002
(0.027)
0.789***
(0.045)
0.170***
(0.048)
0.786***
(0.074)
0.046
(0.036)
0.809***
(0.05)
0.05
(0.04)
0.77***
(0.06)
0.07.
(0.04)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.086
(0.054)
-0.04
(0.032)
0.087
(0.055)
-0.108**
(0.04)
0.086
(0.059)
-0.01
(0.051)
0.11*
(0.053)
0.08*
(0.03)
0.07
(0.05)
0.01
(0.034)
0.096*
(0.044)
0.035.
(0.021)
0.113*
(0.046)
-0.042
(0.031)
0.067
(0.042)
0.062
(0.039)
0.032
(0.041)
0.011
(0.026)
0.11*
(0.05)
0.031
(0.029)
GOVERNANCEt-1 -0.068
(0.057)
0.949***
(0.044)
0.048
(0.050)
0.74***
(0.072)
0.019
(0.084)
0.74***
(0.053)
-0.012
(0.067)
0.77***
(0.05)
0.13
(0.09)
0.85***
(0.066)
GOVERNANCEt-2 0.019
(0.059)
-0.069
(0.049)
-0.008
(0.042)
0.191**
(0.06)
0.026
(0.058)
0.148*
(0.075)
-0.039
(0.059)
-0.03
(0.043)
-0.01
(0.09)
0.022
(0.077)
-0.097*
(0.046)
0.083**
(0.031)
-0.06*
(0.027)
0.012
(0.041)
-0.0005
(0.045)
-0.006
(0.061)
0.081*
(0.039)
0.046
(0.033)
-0.09*
(0.05)
-0.025
(0.032)
CORRUPTIONt-1*Post2000 -0.131***
(0.032)
0.004
(0.021)
-0.037
(0.033)
-0.09*
(0.043)
-0.034
(0.072)
-0.04
(0.04)
-0.055
(0.045)
-0.071.
(0.039)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.082*
(0.038)
CORRUPTIONt-2*Post2000 0.053.
(0.03)
0.096***
(0.016)
0.048*
(0.024)
0.111**
(0.033)
0.039
(0.038)
0.062
(0.038)
0.024
(0.03)
-0.051.
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.02
(0.031)
-0.018
(0.027)
-0.087***
(0.015)
-0.029
(0.022)
-0.01
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.039)
-0.094*
(0.04)
0.055.
(0.033)
-0.007
(0.027)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.019
(0.021)
GOVERNANCEt-1*Post2000 0.207***
(0.046)
0.034
(0.033)
0.052
(0.045)
0.087
(0.063)
0.032
(0.09)
0.056
(0.053)
0.073
(0.072)
0.108*
(0.054)
0.07
(0.07)
0.122*
(0.051)
GOVERNANCEt-2*Post2000 -0.047
(0.037)
-0.035
(0.027)
-0.032
(0.032)
-0.134**
(0.045)
-0.018
(0.041)
-0.034
(0.052)
-0.0004
(0.045)
0.09*
(0.04)
-0.09.
(0.04)
-0.044
(0.043)
0.009
(0.032)
0.017
(0.021)
0.03
(0.023)
0.045
(0.034)
-0.007
(0.039)
0.046
(0.048)
-0.095*
(0.04)
-0.018
(0.035)
0.067
(0.04)
0.017
(0.027)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 1.253e-14 3.002e-08 3.098e-12 2.22e-16 1.538e-12 6.486e-09 4.100e-12 8.69e-13 2.63e-11 2.537e-08
AR (2) (p-value) 0.30835 0.31498 0.33915 0.1946 0.48066 0.0111 0.7631 0.1223 0.3634 0.1942
Wald test for coefficients 147150.7*** 182527.6*** 146859.8*** 38966.3*** 170549.7*** 116355.4*** 158725.9*** 134400.1*** 140663.1*** 231899.6***
Wald test for time dummies 32.70828*** 53.90*** 22.297*** 12.346 19.245 33.376 19.193 24.818*** 21.507*** 18.907
® ® ® ® ® ® ® ® ® ®
		
Table 2 includes the coefficient estimates for the new interaction terms. In particular, the causal link
from one variable to another is checked against the significance of the coefficient estimate of the
sum of the interaction terms on the bolded rows (numbers 9 and 12) in the Table. Inspection of
model (1) (row 12, left columns) shows that there exists a statistically significant one-way Granger
causality from
- RQ to corruption (at 5 % treshold level).
With model (2) (row 9, right columns), the results show statistically significant unidirectional
Granger causalities from
- corruption to VA (at 0.1 % threshold); and
- corruption to GE (at 5 % threshold level).
The results mean that the nexus between corruption and these particular aspects of the quality of
governance has evolved over the breaking point year 2000. However, there still seems to exist no
statistically significant Granger-causalities between corruption and the quality of governance,
measured in terms of PS, or RL in either direction.
The second specification is based on the perception that corruption is a complex phenomenon,
which is likely to be connected to e.g. racial, lingual, political, cultural, historical, and religious
factors that largely determine the socio-economic mentality of particular countries. In order to get
statistically meaningful results, the whole sample of countries is divided into reasonably large sub-
samples. The sub-sampling stands on the assumption that countries close to each other often have
same kinds of mental patterns. Thus, the mental link should hold also over wider areas (Treisman,
2000; Goel and Nelson, 2008). These shared patterns may also be reflected by belonging to
economic and political unions, or defence alliances. Sometimes the geographical aspect may not
imply proximity, but rather the opposite. For example, isolated countries that lay on isles far away
from the mainland may generate common mental features, albeit they may locate quite far from
each other.
The 117 countries in the whole sample are arranged into 7 sub-samples, or country groups.3 In
constructing the groups, the criterion is that the countries in each group are as homogenous as
possible concerning their socio-economic mentality. The sub-sampled country groups are the
following:
- Sub-Saharan Africa (denoted SSA), including: Burundi, Benin, Botswana, Central African
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo,
Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi,
Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Tanzania,
Uganda, South Africa, and Zambia (30 countries in total);
- Latin America (LA), including: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador,
Uruguay, and Venezuela (17 countries in total);
																																																								3	The sub-samples include 115 of the 117 countries. United States and Canada are omitted, because no regressions
can be performed with a group of two (North American) countries, and because it is not reasonable to include them
it the other groups.	
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- Europe (EUR), including: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden (21 countries in total);
- South-East Asia (SEA), including: Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India,
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Viet Nam (9 countries in total);
- East Asia & South Asia (EASA), including: Bangladesh, China, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Macao, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand (9 countries in total);
- Island Countries (ISLA), including: Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Cyprus, Dominican
Republic, Fiji, Ireland, Iceland, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, New
Zealand, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Taiwan (17 countries in total);
- Middle East & Northern Africa (MENA), including: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Turkey (12 countries in
total).
To capture the mentality-dependent specificities, the two baseline models (1) and (2) are re-
estimated with respect to the above grouping. To operationalize the grouping, 7 dummy
variables are used so that they get the value 1, if the country belongs to the country group in
question, and the value 0 otherwise. Interaction terms are now constructed by using the group-
wise dummy multiplication with the corruption and governance variables. In other respects,
the estimation procedure remains unchanged. Table 3 summarizes the relevant information,
and full estimation results are presented in Appendix 3.
		
Table 3: Granger test estimates for the sums of the group-wise interaction terms
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA®COR COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE®COR COR®GE RQ®COR COR®RQ RL®COR COR®RL
0.033
(0.049)
0.009
(0.104)
-0.063
(0.056)
-0.003
(0.040)
-0.102.
(0.058)
0.045
(0.081)
-0.034
(0.054)
-0.028
(0.117)
-0.0003
(0.090)
-0.078
(0.104)
	
0.009
(0.071)
0.107
(0.094)
-0.083
(0.062)
0.082.
(0.048)
0.012
(0.057)
	
0.218**
(0.079)
0.061
(0.059)
0.042
(0.077)
-0.032
(0.064)
0.158
(0.129)
	
0.05
(0.039)
-0.059
(0.063)
0.038
(0.068)
-0.028
(0.050)
0.014
(0.047)
	
-0.201.
(0.120)
0.076.
(0.046)
-0.020
(0.078)
0.016
(0.117)
-0.061
(0.099)
	
0.002
(0.069)
-0.123
(0.103)
0.035
(0.140)
-0.012
(0.139)
-0.029
(0.05)
	
0.251
(0.257)
-0.168*
(0.076)
0.031
(0.135)
-0.117
(0.081)
-0.178
(0.122)
	
-0.091*
(0.038)
-0.027
(0.060)
-0.030
(0.054)
0.104
(0.099)
0.133
(0.132)
	
-0.3272*
(0.151)
0.033
(0.066)
-0.227**
(0.084)
-0.300*
(0.142)
0.028
(0.169)
	
0.011
(0.045)
-0.012
(0.063)
0.023
(0.061)
0.014
(0.044)
-0.113*
(0.051)
	
0.027
(0.119)
-0.0007
(0.058)
0.041
(0.073)
-0.028
(0.095)
0.161
(0.137)
	
-0.003
(0.039)
0.077
(0.063)
0.051
(0.071)
-0.036
(0.061)
-0.024
(0.059)
	
0.069
(0.159)
-0.102
(0.075)
0.077
(0.237)
0.235
(0.163)
0.209
(0.200)
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In Table 3, the attention is again on the coefficients of the sums of the interaction variables. The
areal specification seems have produced a substantial amount of statistically significant estimates
that confirm Granger causality. With model (1) (left columns, even number rows), the results show
that there exists Granger causality in the following cases:
- from VA to corruption in Latin America (at 1 % threshold), in East Asia & South Asia (at
5 % threshold), and in Europe (at 10 % threshold);
- from PS to  corruption  in  South-East  Asia  (at  5  %  threshold),  and  in  Europe  (at  10  %
threshold); and
- from GE and RQ to corruption in East Asia & South Asia (at 5 % threshold).
With model (2) (right columns, odd number rows), the findings show Granger causality in the
following cases:
- from Corruption to VA in East Asia & South Asia (at 5 % threshold);
- from Corruption to RQ in Latin America (at 10 % threshold); and
- from Corruption to RL in  the  Island  Countries  (at  5  % threshold),  and  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa (at 10 % threshold).
However,  no  significant  Granger  causalities  are  found  in  the  country  group  of  Middle  East  &
Northern Africa in either direction.
4 Conclusions
The paper examines the causal nexus between the quality of governance and corruption. The data
includes Word Bank’s WGI indicators on both key variables from 117 countries worldwide over
the period 1996-2013. The methodology to address the issue follows Granger (1969), and
econometric regressions are carried out by dynamic panel data GMM estimations.
The preliminary tests find no Granger causality between governance and corruption in either
direction. However, taking the issue under closer scrutiny, and making further data specifications
reveals considerable causalities in both directions. The first specification concerns the influence of
major anti-corruption efforts taken after 2000. The findings show that the causality between poor
governance and corruption has evolved after the emergence of the efforts, and that the direction
of the causality thereafter depends on the particular measures of the quality of governance.
A strong unidirectional causal link from increasing corruption to the deterioration of the quality of
governance is discovered, when the quality aspects Voice and accountability (citizens’ ability to select
their government, and freedom of expression, association, and media), or Government effectiveness
(quality of public services, independence of civil servants from political pressures, quality if policy
formulation and implementation, and government’s commitment to policies) are concerned. On
the other side, there is a strong unidirectional causality from bad Regulatory quality (government’s
ability to implement policies and regulations that promote private sector development) to
increasing corruption. Still, no causal links are found in either direction, when the quality of
governance is indicated by Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (the likelihood that the
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism), or by Rule of law (agents’ confidence in the rules of society,
		 13	
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and courts, and the likelihood of crime
and violence).
The second specification is reasoned by possible areal differences in socio-economic mentality,
which is supposed to be a major factor in explaining the governance-corruption nexus. The
specification yields strong causal effects between corruption and all the five aspects of the quality
of governance. For instance, In Sub-Saharan Africa, or in Island Countries, unidirectional Granger
causality is observed from corruption to the quality of governance, when Rule of law is concerned.
On the other hand, Europe shows unidirectional causality from the quality of governance to
corruption in terms of Voice and accountability, or Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, and
South-East Asia shows similar pattern concerning the latter aspect of the quality of governance.
However,  the  case  is  not  so  clear  with  other  country  groups.  For  example  in  Latin  America,
causality is observed from corruption to the quality of governance, measured in terms of Regulatory
quality,  but  from the  quality  of  governance  to  corruption,  when  quality  is  measured  in  terms  of
Voice and accountability. The case is particularly complicated concerning East Asia & South Asia. The
causality from the quality of governance to corruption is clear in terms of Government effectiveness and
Regulatory quality, but there seems to be strong causalities in both directions, when quality is
measured in terms of Voice and accountability. The finding that both increasing corruption disrupts
governance and bad governance rouses corruption yields proof for endogeneity that is too deep to
be itemized by the Granger test.
As a summary, the two specifications clearly improve the power of the Granger causality test, and
manage to produce significant results on the issue. Operating the two specifications in the same
regression would lead to spurious estimations, but, in any case, the results of the two specification
rounds can be compared. Juxtaposing the results shows that both of them reveal causality from
the quality of governance to corruption, when quality is measured by Regulatory quality, and causality
from corruption to the quality of governance, when quality is measured by Voice and accountability.
Noting that both hold in East & South Asia, and recalling the above discussion about the
endogeneity of corruption and governance in that area, a deeper look on the issue in that socio-
economically very interesting area should well be worthy of taking.
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Appendix 1
List of countries/territories in the sample (117 in total)
Albania
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo, Republic of
Democratic Rep. of Congo
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Laos
Lesotho
Liberia
Luxembourg
Macao
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Mexico
Nepal
Niger
Namibia
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Zambia
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Appendix 2
Descriptive statistics:
Minimum Median Mean Std. dev. Maximum
COR -0.0895 1.3095 1.1453 0.3995 1.7151
VA 0.5150 1.2527 1.1922 0.2970 1.7121
PS 0.6054 1.2448 1.2317 0.2732 1.8998
GE 0.0679 1.2622 1.1418 0.3571 1.7014
RQ 0.2253 1.2229 1.1457 0.3139 1.7771
RL 0.4057 1.2863 1.1709 0.3393 1.7457
Note: The statistics are based on logarithmic values of variables.
Result of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests:
Variable AD-F Statistics P-value
COR -10.814 < 0.01
VA -9.8521 < 0.01
PS -9.8957 < 0.01
GE -9.9102 < 0.01
RQ -8.5446 < 0.01
RL -10.374 < 0.01
Note: The series are stationary if all probabilities (P-values) associated to the
D-F statistics are smaller than the critical value 0.05.
	
The Philipps-Perron unit-root test:
Variable D-F Statistics P-value
COR -31.9 0.01
VA -30.974 0.01
PS -33.097 0.01
GE -30.407 0.01
RQ -32.014 0.01
RL -31.423 0.01
Note: The Phillips-Perron test is a variation of the basic Dickey-Fuller test,
and the D-F statistics differ from the AD-F statistics. The null hypothesis is
that the series have a unit root against a stationary alternative. It is rejected,
if all probabilities (P-values) associated with the D-F statistics are smaller than
the critical value 0.05.
	
	
	
		 18	
Appendix 3
3.1 Results for Granger causality tests for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA ®COR COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE ®COR COR®GE RQ®COR COR ®RQ RL ®COR COR®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.774***
(0.038)
-0.009
(0.021)
0.751***
(0.037)
0.114***
(0.033)
0.754***
(0.041)
0.020
(0.03)
0.764***
(0.037)
-0.01
(0.029)
0.712***
(0.048)
0.023
(0.033)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.109.
(0.056)
0.043
(0.028)
0.103.
(0.06)
-0.033
(0.031)
0.098.
(0.057)
0.053
(0.035)
0.112.
(0.059)
0.049
(0.032)
0.118*
(0.052)
0.039
(0.025)
0.088.
(0.046)
-0.014
(0.019)
0.098.
(0.051)
-0.038
(0.029)
0.073
(0.052)
0.014
(0.03)
0.074
(0.052)
0.005
(0.023)
0.084
(0.051)
0.052
(0.035)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.111.
(0.066)
0.935***
(0.044)
0.089*
(0.035)
0.775***
(0.052)
0.055
(0.06)
0.758***
(0.053)
0.023
(0.045)
0.892***
(0.047)
0.239*
(0.099)
0.954***
(0.068)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.009
(0.073)
-0.056
(0.041)
-0.019
(0.036)
0.076
(0.050)
0.012
(0.056)
0.106.
(0.063)
-0.021
(0.047)
0.015
(0.038)
-0.102
(0.105)
-0.044
(0.083)
-0.066
(0.056)
0.088**
(0.033)
-0.008
(0.025)
0.059.
(0.035)
0.008
(0.039)
0.006
(0.046)
0.043
(0.044)
0.028
(0.033)
-0.043
(0.058)
-0.055.
(0.031)
CORRUPTIONt-1*SSA -0.054
(0.090)
-0.016
(0.058)
-0.005
(0.087)
-0.118
(0.072)
-0.072
(0.119)
0.013
(0.06)
-0.01
(0.100)
0.076
(0.055)
-0.016
(0.101)
-0.002
(0.055)
CORRUPTIONt-2*SSA 0.116
(0.122)
-0.004
(0.062)
0.111
(0.126)
0.152.
(0.085)
0.09
(0.147)
-0.051
(0.064)
0.119
(0.134)
0.022
(0.055)
0.035
(0.122)
0.012
(0.042)
-0.036
(0.076)
0.033
(0.049)
-0.063
(0.074)
0.009
(0.104)
-0.042
(0.084)
-0.063
(0.056)
-0.057
(0.082)
-0.003
(0.040)
-0.031
(0.084)
-0.102.
(0.058)
GOVERNANCEt-1*SSA 0.013
(0.103)
0.047
(0.075)
0.016
(0.062)
0.016
(0.074)
0.074
(0.133)
-0.023
(0.093)
0.050
(0.126)
-0.193*
(0.086)
-0.112
(0.142)
-0.178.
(0.107)
GOVERNANCEt-2*SSA -0.089
(0.111)
-0.123
(0.107)
-0.027
(0.071)
0.008
(0.083)
-0.027
(0.154)
0.065
(0.09)
-0.102
(0.176)
0.020
(0.086)
0.196
(0.148)
0.148
(0.110)
0.045
(0.081)
0.059
(0.072)
-0.034
(0.054)
-0.07
(0.058)
-0.028
(0.117)
0.069
(0.075)
-0.0003
(0.090)
0.081
(0.066)
-0.078
(0.104)
0.124.
(0.064)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 3.5859e-14 5.7487e-12 1.044e-14 3.4191e-16 2.22e-16 1.0295e-07 1.0367e-15 1.931e-12 6.8736e-16 6.1627e-11
AR (2) (p-value) 0.81802 0.80678 0.92143 0.2708 0.69044 0.33686 0.64356 0.041725 0.78988 0.36096
Wald test for coefficients 51052.98*** 56406.94*** 40733.12*** 7846.56*** 41575.62*** 43305.39*** 25796.94*** 28435.41*** 36917.51*** 7813.14***
Wald test for time dummies 31.424*** 21.544*** 27.0254*** 15.863 30.2312*** 46.60*** 29.2584*** 25.419*** 28.661*** 20.871***
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3.2 Results for Granger causality tests for Latin America (LA)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA®COR COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE®COR COR®GE RQ®OR COR®RQ RL®COR COR®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.771***
(0.036)
-0.009
(0.019)
0.745***
(0.037)
0.080*
(0.033)
0.741***
(0.042)
0.007
(0.028)
0.762***
(0.037)
-0.005
(0.027)
0.695***
(0.046)
0.025
(0.029)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.124*
(0.054)
0.038
(0.026)
0.126*
(0.058)
0.001
(0.031)
0.109*
(0.055)
0.037
(0.033)
0.134*
(0.056)
0.057*
(0.029)
0.12*
(0.049)
0.04.
(0.023)
0.072.
(0.043)
-0.009
(0.018)
0.086.
(0.047)
-0.044
(0.030)
0.053
(0.05)
0.009
(0.029)
0.059
(0.049)
-0.009
(0.021)
0.068
(0.052)
0.033
(0.034)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.106.
(0.058)
0.963***
(0.038)
0.115***
(0.031)
0.793***
(0.046)
0.07
(0.058)
0.775***
(0.051)
0.049
(0.046)
0.856***
(0.047)
0.25**
(0.083)
0.912***
(0.065)
GOVERNANCEt-2 0.017
(0.061)
-0.105*
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.035)
0.085*
(0.040)
0.029
(0.055)
0.130*
(0.061)
-0.044
(0.053)
0.027
(0.038)
-0.031
(0.093)
-0.007
(0.076)
-0.083.
(0.044)
0.108***
(0.032)
-0.024
(0.023)
0.038
(0.028)
0.009
(0.040)
0.016
(0.045)
0.049
(0.044)
0.065.
(0.033)
-0.075
(0.048)
-0.026
(0.027)
CORRUPTIONt-1*LA -0.072
(0.074)
-0.022
(0.102)
-0.020
(0.071)
0.115
(0.103)
-0.006
(0.074)
0.009
(0.054)
-0.019
(0.074)
0.075
(0.09)
0.001
(0.081)
0.003
(0.055)
CORRUPTIONt-2*LA 0.028
(0.128)
0.051
(0.107)
-0.051
(0.143)
-0.205
(0.129)
-0.017
(0.153)
0.086
(0.082)
-0.058
(0.154)
-0.148
(0.109)
-0.018
(0.147)
0.006
(0.046)
0.057
(0.093)
0.009
(0.071)
0.11
(0.111)
0.107
(0.094)
0.131
(0.116)
-0.083
(0.062)
0.137
(0.118)
0.082.
(0.048)
0.105
(0.115)
0.012
(0.057)
GOVERNANCEt-1*LA 0.163
(0.107)
-0.068
(0.082)
-0.105.
(0.054)
-0.041
(0.099)
0.014
(0.115)
0.123
(0.093)
-0.120
(0.091)
0.153*
(0.067)
-0.042
(0.166)
0.064
(0.116)
GOVERNANCEt-2*LA -0.39**
(0.125)
0.054
(0.119)
0.001
(0.06)
-0.067
(0.167)
-0.172
(0.118)
-0.214.
(0.124)
0.086
(0.105)
-0.048
(0.073)
-0.212
(0.236)
0.005
(0.160)
0.218**
(0.079)
-0.032
(0.066)
0.061
(0.059)
0.09
(0.099)
0.042
(0.077)
0.08
(0.089)
-0.032
(0.064)
-0.111*
(0.048)
0.158
(0.129)
-0.083
(0.078)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 2.0797e-14 4.7476e-11 8.0657e-14 4.0555e-15 9.2921e-16 9.9382e-08 4.0553e-15 4.345e-13 3.885e-15 1.3866e-10
AR (2) (p-value) 0.87171 0.9521 0.9706 0.3348 0.73559 0.107 0.81839 0.018638 0.79686 0.36155
Wald test for coefficients 56371.35*** 69339.47*** 31357.76*** 6122.13*** 39395.19*** 25756.45*** 32082.9*** 15647.18*** 25686.5*** 46835.63***
Wald test for time dummies 30.944*** 24.609*** 26.106*** 15.994 29.59291*** 44.724*** 29.373*** 25.053*** 28.294*** 19.487
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3.3 Results for Granger causality tests for Europe (EUR)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA ®COR COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE ®
COR
COR®GE RQ®COR COR ®RQ RL ®COR COR®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.759***
(0.034)
-0.007
(0.024)
0.738***
(0.033)
0.079*
(0.038)
0.728***
(0.038)
-0.019
(0.029)
0.766***
(0.038)
-0.013
(0.03)
0.684***
(0.051)
0.034
(0.035)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.123*
(0.061)
0.038
(0.03)
0.106
(0.065)
0.004
(0.035)
0.119.
(0.062)
0.062.
(0.032)
0.038.
(0.064)
0.048
(0.034)
0.125*
(0.054)
0.059*
(0.026)
0.094.
(0.051)
-0.022
(0.02)
0.097.
(0.054)
-0.025
(0.033)
0.066
(0.06)
-0.002
(0.029)
0.079
(0.058)
0.007
(0.023)
0.089
(0.056)
0.034
(0.038)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.188***
(0.053)
0.972***
(0.038)
0.108**
(0.035)
0.797***
(0.049)
0.134*
(0.064)
0.83***
(0.038)
0.033
(0.054)
0.853***
(0.056)
0.258**
(0.099)
0.930***
(0.071)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.108*
(0.054)
-0.100*
(0.046)
-0.008
(0.036)
0.083.
(0.047)
-0.067
(0.056)
0.035
(0.042)
-0.032
(0.056)
0.037
(0.04)
-0.095
(0.094)
-0.039
(0.081)
-0.017
(0.045)
0.090**
(0.032)
-0.025
(0.025)
0.017
(0.032)
0.022
(0.050)
0.049
(0.04)
0.032
(0.038)
0.027
(0.035)
-0.049
(0.049)
-0.035
(0.027)
CORRUPTIONt-1*EUR 0.022
(0.094)
-0.028
(0.042)
0.028
(0.11)
0.063
(0.057)
0.045
(0.099)
0.114
(0.074)
0.001
(0.101)
0.078
(0.053)
0.073
(0.108)
-0.026
(0.047)
CORRUPTIONt-2*EUR 0.012
(0.101)
0.012
(0.051)
0.053
(0.109)
-0.059
(0.063)
0.008
(0.106)
-0.024
(0.083)
0.049
(0.113)
-0.02
(0.050)
0.018
(0.106)
-0.062
(0.046)
-0.067
(0.070)
0.05
(0.039)
-0.047
(0.067)
-0.059
(0.063)
-0.045
(0.076)
0.038
(0.068)
-0.033
(0.069)
-0.028
(0.050)
-0.084
(0.072)
0.014
(0.047)
GOVERNANCEt-1*EUR -0.193
(0.120)
-0.152*
(0.071)
-0.014
(0.057)
-0.050
(0.087)
-0.196.
(0.105)
-0.197*
(0.089)
-0.007
(0.099)
-0.013
(0.076)
-0.188
(0.154)
-0.119
(0.095)
GOVERNANCEt-2*EUR 0.456**
(0.167)
0.003
(0.091)
-0.085
(0.067)
-0.059
(0.079)
0.222*
(0.101)
0.1796.
(0.106)
-0.016
(0.112)
-0.085
(0.07)
0.257.
(0.141)
0.153
(0.101)
-0.201.
(0.120)
0.106*
(0.06)
0.076.
(0.046)
0.153**
(0.051)
-0.020
(0.078)
-0.126
(0.089)
0.016
(0.117)
0.046
(0.062)
-0.061
(0.099)
0.035
(0.067)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 8.1079e-13 1.5708e-11 4.2963e-14 1.4248e-14 2.22e-16 2.5577e-09 7.48e-16 1.9706e-13 2.22e-16 3.4323e-10
AR (2) (p-value) 0.79533 0.94961 0.90884 0.26934 0.9452 0.65173 0.9526 0.051622 0.95283 0.34218
Wald test for coefficients 78078.84*** 103971.6*** 34713.15*** 13074.63*** 62001.16*** 50755.61*** 36468.7*** 58924.93*** 69054.87*** 91035.52***
Wald test for time dummies 31.368*** 21.91*** 27.182*** 14.950 32.422*** 37.100*** 31.451*** 24.70289*** 29.198*** 19.457
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3.4 Results for Granger causality tests for South-East Asia (SEA)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA ®COR COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE ®COR COR®GE RQ®COR COR ®RQ RL ®COR COR®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.748***
(0.035)
-0.025
(0.019)
0.736***
(0.036)
0.087**
(0.033)
0.736***
(0.041)
0.021
(0.025)
0.755***
(0.036)
-0.009
(0.025)
0.68***
(0.043)
0.001
(0.026)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.127*
(0.054)
0.056*
(0.025)
0.123*
(0.057)
-0.019
(0.031)
0.109*
(0.054)
0.042
(0.033)
0.138*
(0.056)
0.063*
(0.029)
0.129**
(0.049)
0.05*
(0.022)
0.083*
(0.042)
-0.009
(0.018)
0.099*
(0.046)
-0.031
(0.029)
0.071
(0.049)
0.007
(0.027)
0.07
(0.047)
0.008
(0.018)
0.075
(0.049)
0.034
(0.031)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.143**
(0.051)
0.951***
(0.037)
0.105***
(0.03)
0.803***
(0.043)
0.053
(0.06)
0.748***
(0.053)
0.049
(0.045)
0.873***
(0.048)
0.253**
(0.079)
0.925***
(0.066)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.027
(0.055)
-0.093*
(0.043)
-0.041
(0.033)
0.069.
(0.042)
0.028
(0.05)
0.132*
(0.061)
-0.067
(0.047)
0.005
(0.038)
-0.075
(0.092)
-0.002
(0.076)
-0.064
(0.041)
0.108***
(0.031)
-0.004
(0.022)
0.048
(0.03)
0.007
(0.040)
0.033
(0.046)
0.063
(0.041)
0.041
(0.029)
-0.047
(0.049)
-0.029
(0.026)
CORRUPTIONt-1*SEA 0.192.
(0.107)
0.210***
(0.055)
0.147
(0.094)
0.028
(0.08)
0.150
(0.117)
-0.003
(0.144)
0.106
(0.143)
0.137
(0.101)
0.253.
(0.149)
0.26**
(0.091)
CORRUPTIONt-2*SEA 0.004
(0.147)
0.233**
(0.079)
-0.048
(0.133)
0.087
(0.094)
0.001
(0.184)
0.023
(0.073)
-0.114
(0.175)
-0.153*
(0.066)
-0.143
(0.215)
-0.222*
(0.104)
-0.174*
(0.073)
0.002
(0.069)
-0.082
(0.066)
-0.123
(0.103)
-0.118
(0.114)
0.035
(0.140)
-0.084
(0.063)
-0.012
(0.139)
-0.042
(0.119)
-0.029
(0.05)
GOVERNANCEt-1*SEA -0.342*
(0.152)
0.131.
(0.079)
-0.026
(0.077)
-0.228*
(0.115)
0.076
(0.13)
0.130.
(0.073)
-0.222*
(0.096)
-0.083
(0.177)
-0.271
(0.198)
-0.051
(0.102)
GOVERNANCEt-2*SEA 0.059
(0.298)
-0.052
(0.106)
0.178*
(0.087)
0.141
(0.157)
-0.143
(0.215)
-0.144
(0.119)
0.431***
(0.115)
0.131
(0.095)
0.38.
(0.202)
0.118
(0.146)
0.251
(0.257)
-0.059
(0.058)
-0.168*
(0.076)
0.082
(0.073)
0.031
(0.135)
-0.055
(0.086)
-0.117
(0.081)
-0.023
(0.114)
-0.178
(0.122)
-0.08
(0.078)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 1.0708e-14 5.5488e-11 4.6557e-14 4.0688e-15 2.3489e-16 2.6064e-07 2.6137e-15 2.7703e-13 8.5524e-16 2.4131e-10
AR (2) (p-value) 0.86035 0.98067 0.90349 0.30233 0.76886 0.09013 0.9282 0.014724 0.86769 0.5351
Wald test for coefficients 191112.8*** 92902.28*** 133487.7*** 10970.9*** 72955.83*** 47390.58*** 2.22e-
16***
32524.62*** 234713.1*** 48309.2***
Wald test for time dummies 32.967*** 23.745*** 25.526*** 15.680 31.8721*** 45.1122*** 0.0014*** 24.639*** 29.2818*** 18.42703
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3.5 Results for Granger causality tests for East Asia & South Asia (EASA)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA ®COR COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE ®
COR
COR®GE RQ®COR COR ®RQ RL ®COR COR®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.784***
(0.037)
-0.009
(0.022)
0.761***
(0.037)
0.082*
(0.034)
0.775***
(0.04)
0.021
(0.030)
0.778***
(0.038)
0.021
(0.027)
0.732***
(0.039)
0.038
(0.024)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.139**
(0.048)
0.027
(0.025)
0.134**
(0.05)
-0.005
(0.032)
0.124*
(0.049)
0.044
(0.034)
0.141**
(0.051)
0.039
(0.025)
0.124*
(0.048)
0.031
(0.022)
0.046
(0.031)
-0.004
(0.018)
0.061.
(0.033)
-0.032
(0.031)
0.032
(0.035)
0.010
(0.031)
0.029
(0.034)
0.0009
(0.019)
0.038
(0.032)
0.010
(0.02)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.081.
(0.044)
0.958***
(0.035)
0.106***
(0.031)
0.745***
(0.042)
0.017
(0.047)
0.748***
(0.051)
0.035
(0.048)
0.858***
(0.042)
0.182***
(0.053)
0.877***
(0.038)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.027
(0.061)
-0.105*
(0.046)
-0.013
(0.031)
0.094*
(0.040)
0.033
(0.055)
0.113.
(0.062)
-0.031
(0.048)
0.004
(0.030)
0.019
(0.073)
0.063
(0.042)
-0.019
(0.042)
0.116***
(0.030)
-0.017
(0.022)
0.064*
(0.029)
0.023
(0.035)
0.039
(0.044)
0.068.
(0.041)
0.062*
(0.030)
-0.074
(0.051)
-0.033
(0.028)
CORRUPTIONt-1*EASA -0.164.
(0.096)
-0.009
(0.052)
-0.153*
(0.075)
0.0004
(0.062)
-0.222**
(0.08)
-0.073
(0.046)
-0.199.
(0.102)
-0.229**
(0.082)
-0.344*
(0.139)
-0.201.
(0.116)
CORRUPTIONt-2*EASA -0.061
(0.211)
0.155.
(0.09)
-0.091
(0.214)
-0.031
(0.079)
-0.076
(0.200)
0.016
(0.064)
-0.133
(0.218)
0.085
(0.174)
0.032
(0.178)
0.115
(0.070)
0.2627**
(0.085)
-0.091*
(0.038)
0.330.
(0.180)
-0.027
(0.060)
0.306*
(0.137)
-0.030
(0.054)
0.406.
(0.216)
0.104
(0.099)
0.313
(0.201)
0.133
(0.132)
GOVERNANCEt-1*EASA 0.156
(0.131)
-0.009
(0.097)
0.113
(0.137)
0.471***
(0.112)
0.405.
(0.216)
0.207*
(0.092)
0.132
(0.173)
0.141
(0.145)
0.471.
(0.241)
0.428*
(0.179)
GOVERNANCEt-2*EASA 0.132
(0.155)
0.101
(0.092)
-0.235
(0.171)
-0.380*
(0.162)
-0.180
(0.170)
0.042
(0.153)
0.090
(0.124)
0.117
(0.171)
-0.498**
(0.153)
-0.540*
(0.236)
-0.3272*
(0.151)
-0.142
(0.088)
0.033
(0.066)
-0.027
(0.100)
-0.227**
(0.084)
-0.162
(0.153)
-0.300*
(0.142)
-0.221*
(0.103)
0.028
(0.169)
0.060
(0.069)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 5.5035e-15 1.0584e-13 1.8818e-14 1.2078e-15 2.22e-16 6.4017e-09 2.22e-16 2.4963e-12 5.8564e-16 7.3296e-15
AR (2) (p-value) 0.86137 0.98773 0.6853 0.39798 0.95363 0.0009 0.96595 0.048504 0.79847 0.27555
Wald test for coefficients 56816.75*** 53523.33*** 30416*** 45208.72*** 38179.6*** 34451.16*** 53456.02*** 30189.02*** 30719.11*** 44513.52***
Wald test for time dummies 33.0722*** 24.085*** 25.914*** 17.286 32.106*** 46.233*** 30.962*** 24.073*** 30.429*** 19.82024***
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3.6 Results for Granger causality tests for Island Countries (ISLA)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA ®
COR
COR®VA PS®COR COR®PS GE®COR COR®GE RQ®COR COR ®RQ RL ®COR COR®RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.756***
(0.041)
-0.018
(0.021)
0.736***
(0.041)
0.083*
(0.038)
0.742***
(0.046)
0.011
(0.031)
0.755***
(0.041)
0.015
(0.03)
0.702***
(0.052)
0.015
(0.034)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.112.
(0.062)
0.048.
(0.027)
0.105
(0.066)
-0.018
(0.035)
0.098
(0.062)
0.052
(0.036)
0.112.
(0.065)
0.047
(0.03)
0.113*
(0.057)
0.02
(0.024)
0.102*
(0.049)
-0.013
(0.020)
0.114*
(0.053)
-0.035
(0.033)
0.085
(0.058)
-0.001
(0.032)
0.081
(0.055)
0.0012
(0.024)
0.112.
(0.058)
0.057
(0.035)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.115*
(0.055)
0.969***
(0.032)
0.120***
(0.029)
0.800***
(0.047)
0.065
(0.060)
0.783***
(0.059)
0.041
(0.046)
0.87***
(0.048)
0.219*
(0.093)
0.934***
(0.073)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.024
(0.065)
-0.095*
(0.041)
-0.049
(0.033)
0.062
(0.047)
0.014
(0.062)
0.133.
(0.069)
-0.042
(0.058)
0.018
(0.04)
-0.043
(0.096)
-0.025
(0.081)
-0.059
(0.045)
0.095**
(0.031)
-0.022
(0.023)
0.055.
(0.032)
-0.001
(0.045)
0.001
(0.048)
0.053
(0.041)
0.034
(0.03)
-0.102*
(0.046)
-0.018
(0.028)
CORRUPTIONt-1*ISLA 0.003
(0.061)
0.016
(0.053)
0.036
(0.063)
0.023
(0.057)
-0.012
(0.062)
-0.029
(0.053)
0.004
(0.070)
-0.074
(0.069)
0.030
(0.077)
2.8758e-04
(0.044)
CORRUPTIONt-2*ISLA 0.062
(0.075)
-0.023
(0.065)
0.052
(0.081)
0.019
(0.075)
0.069
(0.075)
-0.035
(0.075)
0.072
(0.078)
0.022
(0.087)
0.062
(0.078)
0.093.
(0.051)
-0.073
(0.056)
0.011
(0.045)
-0.068
(0.065)
-0.012
(0.063)
-0.068
(0.067)
0.023
(0.061)
-0.057
(0.064)
0.014
(0.044)
-0.113
(0.075)
-0.113*
(0.051)
GOVERNANCEt-1*ISLA -0.0002
(0.119)
-0.048
(0.123)
-0.139
(0.102)
-0.073
(0.090)
-0.020
(0.091)
0.017
(0.086)
-0.009
(0.114)
0.01
(0.107)
-0.099
(0.135)
-9.4463e-05
(0.093)
GOVERNANCEt-2*ISLA -0.014
(0.116)
-0.022
(0.129)
0.123
(0.093)
0.081
(0.090)
-0.002
(0.084)
-0.085
(0.097)
0.018
(0.076)
5.5951e-05
(0.072)
-0.037
(0.197)
0.105
(0.115)
0.027
(0.119)
0.068
(0.075)
-0.0007
(0.058)
-0.042
(0.065)
0.041
(0.073)
0.104
(0.080)
-0.028
(0.095)
0.033
(0.078)
0.161
(0.137)
-0.085
(0.062)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 8.148e-16 4.6743e-11 8.8402e-15 1.6874e-15 3.3804e-16 6.4517e-08 1.8121e-15 1.4058e-13 2.22e-16 1.8062e-10
AR (2) (p-value) 0.99089 0.85089 0.78709 0.42164 0.83499 0.41231 0.93402 0.044518 0.89352 0.29076
Wald test for coefficients 68845.75*** 110123.3*** 46278.47*** 5882.147*** 34403.34*** 37974.86*** 46508.82*** 28712.47*** 34722.31*** 69208.39***
Wald test for time dummies 33.525*** 22.785*** 25.6315*** 16.176 30.576*** 45.283*** 29.656*** 25.706*** 28.577*** 18.962
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3.7 Results for Granger causality tests for Middle East & Northern Africa (MENA)
Granger test between
COR & VA
Granger test between
COR & PS
Granger test between
COR & GE
Granger test between
COR & RQ
Granger test between
COR & RL
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VA COR COR VA PS COR COR PS GE COR COR GE RQ COR COR RQ RL COR COR RL
CORRUPTIONt-1 0.760***
(0.037)
0.006
(0.021)
0.753***
(0.037)
0.09**
(0.034)
0.743***
(0.042)
0.020
(0.030)
0.765***
(0.038)
-0.009
(0.028)
0.702***
(0.048)
0.036
(0.031)
CORRUPTIONt-2 0.144**
(0.053)
0.038
(0.027)
0.143**
(0.054)
-0.007
(0.034)
0.125*
(0.053)
0.048
(0.035)
0.143**
(0.054)
0.045
(0.031)
0.142**
(0.047)
0.032
(0.024)
0.065
(0.040)
-0.007
(0.019)
0.069
(0.043)
-0.046
(0.030)
0.046
(0.049)
-0.001
(0.027)
0.054
(0.045)
0.005
(0.022)
0.07
(0.051)
0.031
(0.035)
GOVERNANCEt-1 0.125*
(0.057)
0.94***
(0.038)
0.083**
(0.03)
0.795***
(0.043)
0.063
(0.057)
0.776***
(0.052)
0.019
(0.04)
0.879***
(0.046)
0.223**
(0.082)
0.92***
(0.065)
GOVERNANCEt-2 -0.032
(0.059)
-0.121**
(0.043)
-0.037
(0.033)
0.065
(0.044)
0.018
(0.051)
0.122*
(0.060)
-0.013
(0.051)
0.029
(0.036)
-0.042
(0.085)
0.012
(0.077)
-0.058
(0.043)
0.119***
(0.029)
-0.011
(0.021)
0.055.
(0.029)
0.005
(0.038)
0.010
(0.044)
0.028
(0.038)
0.041
(0.032)
-0.088*
(0.044)
-0.052*
(0.024)
CORRUPTIONt-1*MENA 0.051
(0.094)
-0.096**
(0.032)
0.016
(0.082)
-0.001
(0.068)
0.054
(0.092)
-0.053
(0.046)
0.006
(0.089)
0.017
(0.059)
0.022
(0.097)
-0.113*
(0.052)
CORRUPTIONt-2*MENA -0.150
(0.174)
0.046
(0.045)
-0.166
(0.189)
-0.054
(0.075)
-0.121
(0.167)
0.007
(0.065)
-0.09
(0.179)
0.047
(0.064)
-0.113
(0.139)
0.077
(0.06)
0.083
(0.137)
-0.003
(0.039)
0.124
(0.149)
0.077
(0.063)
0.082
(0.139)
0.051
(0.071)
0.035
(0.157)
-0.036
(0.061)
0.022
(0.127)
-0.024
(0.059)
GOVERNANCEt-1*MENA -0.086
(0.119)
-0.014
(0.097)
0.08
(0.088)
-0.094
(0.172)
-0.017
(0.111)
0.043
(0.093)
0.194.
(0.115)
0.064
(0.088)
0.009
(0.214)
0.104
(0.115)
GOVERNANCEt-2*MENA 0.025
(0.208)
0.233*
(0.108)
0.04
(0.122)
0.118
(0.123)
-0.078
(0.261)
-0.198.
(0.119)
-0.385**
(0.138)
-0.159
(0.116)
-0.151
(0.393)
-0.263.
(0.143)
0.069
(0.159)
-0.161**
(0.062)
-0.102
(0.075)
-0.023
(0.100)
0.077
(0.237)
0.151.
(0.080)
0.235
(0.163)
0.066
(0.086)
0.209
(0.200)
0.222**
(0.079)
Number of observations 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691 2691
Number of groups 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AR (1) (p-value) 2.5465e-14 1.2202e-12 1.0195e-14 6.82e-15 2.22e-16 9.109e-08 1.9701e-15 2.6901e-13 2.22e-16 3.708e-11
AR (2) (p-value) 0.8687 0.77789 0.90076 0.31201 0.7187 0.21318 0.92868 0.03257 0.85527 0.24172
Wald test for coefficients 71839.85*** 70669.69*** 37385.01*** 9472.852*** 33945.98*** 24195.09*** 32216.85*** 17287.28*** 34120.03*** 33524.37***
Wald test for time dummies 29.2981*** 22.617*** 26.567*** 0.0975 28.454*** 45.1637*** 28.1033*** 24.699*** 27.00182*** 21.862***
® ® ® ® ® ® ® ® ® ®
